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The Changing Judiciary
By ARTHUR RosETT*
Stanley Forman Reed was an admirable judge and a
faithful guardian of the United States Constitution. His ac-
complishments are traceable to the unique social and political
background that shaped his character. This article dedicated
to Justice Reed will explore some troublesome problems the
judiciary has experienced with the passing of that political
and social milieu.
First and foremost, Stanley Reed was the patrician son of
Mason County, Kentucky, proud of his inherited land he
farmed and traded as his ancestors had. The Reeds had come
to Washington thirty years before this author met the Justice,
but as with other Washington officials, "home" always re-
ferred to Maysville; the Washington quarters remained a suite
of hotel rooms all those years. At the 'same time, this tradi-
tional and conservative man was an active participant as law-
yer and judge in the great lawful revolutions of his time. The
first draft of the Social Security Act was typed one Sunday on
his office machine. To the lawyer who had learned oral advo-
cacy defending the railroad before hostile juries fell the
unenviable task as Solicitor General of the United States of
defending the New Deal before an unsympathetic and un-
reconstructed Supreme Court. Later he was the second
Roosevelt appointee to a new Supreme Court that became a
central catalyst in transforming American law and life.
All Americans are the beneficiaries of the skill and re-
sponsibility with which Justice Reed exercised his power. His
career of federal service illustrates the awesome degree of
public authority America entrusts to its lawyers and particu-
larly to its judges. Moreover, Stanley Reed's career, now com-
plete, testifies to the ability of the traditional American com-
munity to produce wise social guardians.
Changes in American communities and in the organiza-
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. During October Term
1959 the author was law clerk to Mr. Justice Reed. Ms. Janet Brown's contributions
to this manuscript are greatly appreciated.
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tion of their judiciaries are undermining the supports that tra-
ditionally have guided individual judges' actions. At the risk
of overstating the situation, the judiciary is being transformed
into a group of professional technicians and civil servants op-
erating within large centralized bureaucracies, cut off from
supporting local, political and professional ties. For example:
Significant court reorganizations and consolidations in
more than forty states have strengthened the power of judicial
administrators at the state government level.' Consequently,
local judges, once undisputed rulers of their own domain, are
becoming employees in large organizations funded and man-
aged from the state capitol.
The judiciary has experienced tremendous growth, with
the number of state judges increasing by more than fifty per-
cent during the past decade.2 Accompanying this growth has
been a reduction in what was once a source of status and
strength, the uniqueness of the individual judge.
With the adoption of some form of merit selection of
judges in more than thirty states,3 the selection and retention
of judges now depends less upon the judge's ability to main-
tain close personal ties with local partisan political figures.
Close connections between judges and local community
leaders have been weakened by the Codes of Judicial Conduct
published by the American Bar Association in 1972. These ca-
nons greatly restrict the extent of permissible judicial involve-
1 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES, 1980-81, at 164-65
(1980); Schulert & Hoelzel, Court Reform, 60 JUDICATURE 281 (1977); Report, State
Court Progress at a Glance, 56 JUDICATURE 427 (1973).
2 In 1966 the total number of judges in state major trial courts was reported as
3,694. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES, 1966-67, at 113 (1966).
By 1976, this figure had risen to 5,750, an increase of more than 55%. COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES, 1976-77 at 93 (1976). By 1980, the re-
ported figure was 6,680, an 80% increase over 1966. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
BOOK OF THE STATES, 1980-81, at 150-51 (1980).
3 The uncertain definition of merit selection makes a precise count difficult, but
some form of merit selection can be found in at least some courts in the following
states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming. S.
ESCOVITz, F. KURLAND, & N. GOLD, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE (1975).
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ment in community, charitable and other public work."
Last, the judicial workload has increased tremendously in
most states in recent years. 5 As a result, assembly-line justice
in many urban courts places a heavy emphasis on cost-effi-
cient and speedy disposition of cases at the expense of coher-
ent and deliberate consideration.' Time for reflection has de-
4 See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5.
1 The increase in judicial work can be roughly estimated by a comparison of the
major trial court filings.
In New Jersey between 1966 and 1976 court filings increased 93.8% while the
population grew only 22.5%. N. J., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS
1975-76, xiv. In Oregon, circuit court filings increased 86% between 1965 and 1975
while the population grew 18%. ADMINISTRATION IN OR. 56 (1975). In Michigan, cir-
cuit court filings rose 78% between 1966 and 1976 while the population grew only
9.5%. REPORT OF THE MICH. STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, 1975-76, at 30. In Texas,
district court filings increased during 1965-75 by 67.2% while the state's population
increased 17.9%. THx. CIVIL JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 38TH ANNUAL REPORT 1966, at 97;
TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 48TH ANNUAL REPORT 1976, at 115. In California, superior
court filings rose during 1966-76 by 53% while the population increased 14%. CAL.
1977 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT 196. Finally, in Kansas the population was remarka-
bly stable, increasing only 2.7% over the decade 1965-75, but district court filings
during the same period increased 40%. STATISTICAL REPORT ON DISTRICT COURTS OF
KAN. 5 (July 1, 1975).
It is reported that the population of the United States grew 36% from 1955 to
1979 while the number of court cases filed and disposed of increased during the same
period about 1,000%. Uppal, The State of the Judiciary in COUNCIL OF STATE GOV-
ERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES, 1980-81, 143 (1980).
6 AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW ExPLOSION (1965).
As California Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird told the International Academy
of Trial Lawyers Convention in San Francisco on January 23, 1978:
In some ways, the judicial system is faced with essentially the same prob-
lem which the industrial sector of our nation faced in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries-how to deal with escalating demands for greater pro-
duction. Industry's answer was to move away from the craft approach to-
ward an assembly line operation. Production increased while unit cost de-
creased, and our nation was willing to bear the social costs of the often
accompanying decline in quality.
Today, these methods are spreading into the courts. We must begin to seri-
ously consider what consequences will flow from mass production in a for-
merly individualized process. As the system is mechanized, people become
inanimate objects to be processed. Judges, too, become grist for the com-
puter mill, as they are transformed into "judicial position equivalents" and
their work into "average minutes involved per filing" for the purpose of
cranking out "weighted workload" results.
Instead of running their own courtrooms, our trial judges become workers
on the assembly line of justice, the captives of their caseloads, forced to
measure their success by whether or not they have managed to dispose of
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creased, and a respite from the bench for refreshment or
renewal increasingly is seen as an extravagant luxury.
Many of these changes are concomitants of modern life.
For judges, however, the increasingly centralized and bureau-
cratic qualities of modern life are particularly insidious be-
cause they threaten the autonomy that has been the tradi-
tional basis for entrusting to judges their most sensitive tasks.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF JUDGES
A century and a half ago, de Tocqueville observed that
"[s] carcely any question arises in the United States that is not
resolved sooner or later into a judicial question."'7 While the
few cases that eventually produce an appellate decision may
have a great impact on society, in an important sense the vi-
tality of the judiciary rests primarily on the daily work of trial
judges. Scores of millions of civil and criminal suits are filed
each year in the nation's courts.8 In the totality of decisions in
these matters, justice is given meaning.
all the cases assigned to them on any given day. In large metropolitan dis-
tricts, the courtrooms themselves begin to resemble factories-huge num-
bers of people packed into a court that seems always too crowded, waiting
their turn to be die-stamped by the law.
As in other governmental areas, the growth of bureaucracy in the courts has
been accompanied by a growth in the impersonal nature of the courts and
by a corresponding decrease in the judges' personal accountability and re-
sponsibility. We have to come to terms with an ever-increasing caseload,
but we must be careful that our answer does not bring efficiency at the
expense of a fair hearing.
Were the business of the trial courts simply efficiency, such a result might
be desirable, but justice may be compromised in the process. The sense of
participatory democracy that has characterized our courts in the past is de-
stroyed as the contact between judge and citizen becomes a mechanized
ritual rather than a personal exchange.
7 1 A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (1957).
8 Nationwide figures on the volume and rate of lawsuits are not available.
Extrapolating from three states to the nation at large, if Americans filed civil and
criminal cases (excluding parking tickets) at the rate Californians did in 1976, then
64,700,000 would have been filed that year. If the nation became involved in lawsuits
at the rate Texans did that year 70,439,000 would have been filed. On the other hand,
if we became involved in litigation at the much more modest rate Kansans do, only
slightly less than 4,000,000 lawsuits would have been filed. CAL. 1977 JUDICIAL COUN-
CIL REPORT; TEx. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 49TH ANNUAL REPORT 1977; OFFICE OF THE JUDI-
CIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE COURTS OF KANSAS 1976.
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In addition to private lawsuits, the aggrieved citizen may
also enter the courtroom to challenge governmental action
taken against his interests. Thus, officials are called upon to
answer claims, just as private individuals must respond to
lawsuits against them. The imposition of a tax, the denial of a
license, the revocation of a permit and the zoning of a neigh-
borhood are all subject to judicial intervention.
In recent decades, the courts have played a central role in
lawmaking in America. Frustration with the inability of the
politically-responsive legislative and executive branches to
deal with embedded defects in society has led to greater reli-
ance on the politically-remote judiciary for redress. Some crit-
ics argue that the balance of power has been upset and that
the judiciary engages in too much lawmaking. This criticism
has some merit, for in the past generation both state and fed-
eral courts have assumed an especially active role. As Judge
Shirley Hufstedler, who wrestled with these issues on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, has
observed:
We expect courts to encompass every reach of the law,
and we expect law to encircle us in our earthly sphere and to
travel with us to the alien vastness of outer space. We want
courts to sustain personal liberty, to end our racial tensions,
to outlaw war, and to sweep the contaminants from the
globe. We ask courts to shield us from public wrong and pri-
vate temptation, to penalize us . . . , to adjust our private
differences, to resuscitate our moribund businesses, to pro-
tect us prenatally, to marry us, to divorce us, and, if not to
bury us, at least to see to it that our funeral expenses are
paid. These services, and many more, are supposed to be
quickly performed in temples of justice by a small priestly
caste with the help of a few devoted retainers and an occa-
sional vestal virgin. We are surprised and dismayed because
the system is faltering.9
Although the nation may decide that it has overbuilt its
judiciary and that it must therefore cut back the tasks of
judges to the more modest levels typical of other nations, the
9 Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44
So. CAL. L. REV. 901 (1971).
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unpopularity of a few controversial decisions has not yet been
translated into a political majority willing to so limit the
judiciary.
A. The Public's Expectations Regarding Judges
When a judge rather than some other government official
is given authority to make a decision, it implies a clear prefer-
ence for having the decision made by a person who is autono-
mous, who can apply independent judgment to the matter
under consideration, and who is relatively free from the most
direct forms of political control and influence. Judges are de-
liberately removed from any clear set of rewards and punish-
ments that might shape their behavior in particular ways.
Judges who perform especially well do not get raises, nor are
they likely to get promoted. They have no boss to call them in
and pat them on the back or bawl them out. In our system,
judicial decisions are individual judgments; they are not a re-
sult reached by a department, committee or commission.
Unlike other officials, judges are not just asked to follow
the law; often they are expected to give it meaning. Unlike
other legal professionals, they are not only expected to be cor-
rect and competent in their mastery of the legal rules; they
are asked to choose the better rule and to express values in
their choice. Beyond being responsible, judges are expected to
be sensitive and sensible. People expect that judicial decisions
should not compliantly follow public opinion polls. Judges are
sworn to do more than obey the law: they are also asked to do
justice.
The qualities prized in judges are not static. We conclude
that a person is wise less from one good decision than from a
pattern of decision-making over time. No one is always wise or
always makes the best choices. Wisdom is something like bat-
ting in professional baseball. In either league the player who
bats .300 consistently over a career is doing very well indeed.
B. Selecting Wise Judges
In the past, the selection and retention of judges has
served as the primary occasion for insuring the quality of the
judiciary. The selection of competent persons carries with it
[Vol. 69
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an expection that those persons will perform well. Americans
select their judges in a variety of ways. Despite the variations,
two common characteristics of American practice are unusual
to the rest of the world. First, nowhere in America are judicial
appointments based on civil service examinations or on aca-
demic proficiency. In many countries, however, judges are ap-
pointed from a promotion list, based upon performance on an
examination demonstrating technical proficiency in the law.10
Second, while in much of the world judges are recruited upon
successful completion of their university training, when they
have limited practical experience,"" nowhere in America are
judges routinely selected at the outset of their professional ca-
reers. Instead, American judges, like their English counter-
parts, are appointed in mid-career and middle age. Becoming
a judge is often dependent upon proven success in the prac-
tice of law. Thus, selection of American judges strongly em-
phasizes experience and wisdom in practical affairs rather
than intellectual brilliance. Despite this emphasis on experi-
ence, uncertainty as to whether the selection process alone
will safeguard the integrity of the judiciary is reflected in the
practice, also unique to the Western world, of requiring judges
to be re-elected or reappointed after each term of office. Yet
these judicial retention elections, once required, tend to de-
generate into merely pro forma ratifications, indicating a na-
tional ambivalence regarding their usefulness.
Throughout American history the method of selecting
judges has been a persistent issue, and there have been a
number of dramatic shifts in the favored method. History
records an oscillation between an elite, tenured, highly profes-
sional judiciary, removed from direct partisan political pres-
sures and a populist, responsive, partisan judiciary, drawn
from a cross-section of the community, serving for a short
term, and subject to popular recall. 2
Although the early colonies had tended to regard lawyers
with suspicion and to rely on judges with little or no legal
10 J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 111 (1969).
11 A. VON MEHREN & J. GOODLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 1148-49 (2d ed. 1977).
12 E. HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 80-135 (1944); Winters, Se-
lection of Judges-An Historical Introduction, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1081 (1966).
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training, the new states established a professional judiciary.
Its members were appointed by either the governor or the leg-
islature and held office for a long tenure, in a few cases for
life.13
By the middle third of the nineteenth century, the domi-
nant democrats were highly critical of an appointed judiciary
that often frustrated popular reform, and they called for a
more politically responsive judiciary.14 Election of judges for
short terms replaced the appointive process everywhere ex-
cept in a few of the eastern seaboard states and in the federal
systems. As new states joined the growing Union, each pro-
vided for election of judges.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century and the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, nonpartisan judicial ballots,
separate judicial nominating conventions, and direct primaries
for judges became popular ways to mitigate partisan pres-
sures, particularly where the Progressive movement had im-
pact. Beginning in the second quarter of the century and con-
tinuing to the present, the bar's influence has been reflected
in movements that have brought some form of nonpartisan,
nonelective merit selection plan to at least thirty states. The
trend toward merit selection continues, although some critics
now ask just what constitutes "merit," while others question
whether the committee system is an appropriate process
through which to make these selections.1 5
13 F. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYsTmi 3-194 (1940); J. HURST,
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1973); R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 26-90
(1940); Smith An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 24 U. PA. L.
REV. 1104 (1976); Swindler, Seedtime of an American Judiciary: From Independence
to the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503 (1976).
14 See R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG
REPUBLIC (1971).
1 The crux of the merit system, in the eyes of its advocates, is the selection
function of the commission.
It is in this crux I find troubling. That is not just because I come from
Washington, where skepticism about committees is almost as prevalent as
committees; indeed, in Washington it is said that nothing is impossi-
ble-until you assign it to a committee. I am troubled by judicial selection
by committee because it seems to me that two biases, or risks of biases,
inhere in the process: 1) objective criteria will be given undue weight; and
2) to the extent subjective factors are considered, they will be value-free or
technical ones.
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This evolution in the process of selecting judges seems to
have left America as ambivalent as ever on the issue of
whether judges should be isolated and insulated from direct
political pressure. Should judges reflect the majority senti-
ment in their community and be removed from office when
they or the community depart from the majoritarian atti-
tudes? Should judges, for example, be elected and retained on
the basis of their views on abortion, on the use of busing to
achieve school desegregation or on their announced toughness
on the criminal defendant? Or should judicial elections de-
pend upon the character, dedication and talent of the candi-
dates? The heart of the problem is that for judges to be set
apart, to be autonomous in their official actions, is always in
conflict with notions of democratic popular sovereignty. The
public wants judges to be independent, wise community lead-
ers; at the same time, it is suspicious of that independence.
That suspicion often results in attempts to subject judges to
the kinds of democratic elective controls to which other public
servants are subject. Interestingly, this uncertainty over
whether judges should be wise leaders or responsive public
servants has not led the public to view judges as mere techni-
cians. Instead, the American experience provides eloquent evi-
dence of a commitment to the view that judges are more than
mere technical experts and that more is desired from a judge
than information and intelligence.
II. THE BALANCING NETWORK OF JUSTICE
Almost every American courthouse has a physical re-
minder that justice involves a process of weighing and balanc-
ing. Atop the cupola of many of these older buildings, the
blindfolded goddess stands with the sword of public power in
The temptation for committees to rely on objective criteria is obvious. Such
criteria simplify the task of paring down long lists of names to manageable
numbers. Moreover, they can avoid endless debates as to which candidates
have demonstrated the best knowledge of the law, for example, by provid-
ing seemingly clear measurements.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Address to the American College of Trial Lawyers, San
Diego, Calif., March 14, 1977.
See also A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION (1974);
L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, THE U.S. CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION (1980).
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one hand and the balancing scales in the other. If justice were
dispensed by a marble goddess, and if the process of justice
involved only putting weights in balancing pans and letting
gravity decide, the process would be less problematic. Justice,
however, is dispensed by judges, of whom more is expected
than human flesh can consistently provide. Judges must be
experts in finding, interpreting and applying rules of law. A
judge must be a master of procedure, expert in the details of
pleading and evidence, and competent to supervise the techni-
calities of trial. These expectations indicate that the judge is
primarily viewed as a senior member of the legal profession
and suggest that what is considered the most important as-
pect of a judge's performance is professional competence, the
compatibility of his behavior with the learning and traditions
of the bar.
Judges are also government officials exercising public
power, and they must follow administrative rules just as other
officials must. A hierarchy of courts exists in which appeals
courts review the work of trial courts to ensure that the rules
are obeyed. Judges are expected to work hard, to be present in
the office, to do a full day's work, and to carry their share of
the court's caseload. In addition, judges, as public officers in a
democracy, must account to the public for their exercise of
power. Thus, in viewing the judge primarily as a public officer,
the important inquiry into each judge's performance is
whether he is orderly, diligent, economical and responsive to
the wishes and policies of managerial supervisors and the
electorate.
A judge must be wise while balancing that wisdom with
sympathy, practical understanding and peace-keeping accom-
modation. It is hard to give precise meaning to these virtues,
particularly in the uncertain situations judges face.
No human could hope to satisfy the apparently inconsis-
tent demands on judges. Judges are expected to be decisive
and firm but also deliberate and patient. They must be
hardworking and efficient but not brusque or hurried. They
should be dignified but not remote or lacking the common
touch. Judges not only are subject to divergent expections,
but they are also responsible to conflicting influential commu-
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nity groups. The general electorate, the partisan political lead-
ership, the professional leaders of the bar, the bureaucratic di-
rectors of the courthouse administration and the congeries of
ideological, economic and class interest groups possessing
community influence, all make their viewpoints known and
their power felt. The judiciary has no dominant measure of
job effectiveness and no single guardian to whom it must an-
swer. Instead, each judge is pulled by a variety of divergent
demands. Consequently, the system depends on the individual
trial judge to sort out the signals, to filter the static and to
balance the conflicts.
III. THE BALANCING NETWORK OF POWER
The image of balancing has another connotation for the
judiciary, for the strategy used in America to preserve free
government has been to make power safe by dividing it and to
keep it safe by preventing any of those who share it from
overpowering the others. This strategy has been applied
throughout the allocation of political authority. Those who
wield power are never free from the need to account to and to
gain the approval of the other branches of government, but
each branch is autonomous within its own sphere.
American political thought and practice recognize and
preserve the separate identities of diverse groups that exert
influence within the community. By forming coalitions with
competitive groups, these groups assert their special interests
and thereby influence government. Successful American polit-
ical parties are coalitions of diverse groups that balance their
desire for independent action against their dependence on
other groups with overlapping interests. Thus, a free and dy-
namic society is maintained by recognizing the legitimacy of
special interests and by balancing the influence of one against
the others.
This strategy of balancing conflicting views is consistent
with the common law preference for judge-made rules. Com-
mon law permits the currents of different attitudes to be
heard and absorbed. It is not systematic or ideological, nor
does it deduce its rules from abstract principles and codes.
Instead, it pragmatically seeks to build social order from the
1980-81]
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conflicts of disorderly experience.
Similarly, the American judiciary was organized to serve
our concept of highly decentralized and limited government.
The newly created states became the basic units of lawmaking
and administration, but the judiciary took on a highly local
flavor. Rather than being a state government delegate in the
locality, the judge was locally selected and served only in a
specified territory. In contrast to the English model, the jus-
tice of the peace, who disposed of most minor judicial busi-
ness, was not the governor's man in town. He was the town's
man, locally selected and largely free of direct outside supervi-
sion. The administrative accountability of judges was nominal.
Judges were not co-workers in a single judicial organization.
Each sat alone, with the county, and not the state, paying his
salary and other expenses. If the judge in a particular county
was overworked, no one could assign some of this work to a
judge in a neighboring county with little work of his own. In
courthouses with more than one judge, collegial courtesy
rather than administrative power was likely to govern the re-
lations between the judges.
The organization of justice in America has been built
upon a small cadre of judges. Each town or county selects a
small number of judges to serve, and each judge gains impor-
tance from the rarity of the judicial status. The small size of
the judiciary becomes apparent when viewed without the large
number of part-time, nonprofessional judges of limited or spe-
cial jurisdiction. Only 7,000 to 10,000 full-time judges serve a
nation of over 220,000,000 persons.16 Thus, American judges
constitute a remarkably small part of the legal profession.
Only one to two percent of this country's lawyers are full-time
professional judges. This contrasts with other nations such as
France, Germany and Sweden, where about one-third of the
"6 In total there are about 25,000 judges in this country, but well over two-thirds
of them are judges of courts of limited or special jurisdiction, many of whom work
part-time on traffic and other minor cases. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., NATIONAL SURVEY OF COURT ORGANIZATION 2, 5 (1973
& 1977 Supp.). In the U.S. there are roughly 45 judges per million population. In
West Germany it has been estimated that there were 213 judges per million popula-
tion in 1973. E. JOHNSON, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATISTICAL DIMENSIONS OF
JUSTICE SYSTEMS OF SEVEN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES Ch. IX, Table I (1977).
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lawyers are judges.17
Judges had no controlling supervisors, but this does not
mean they were free-floating in space. Instead, they were con-
strained by their responsibility both to the local community
and to the law to consider pending matters independently.
Traditionally, autonomous judges were central participants in
a network of ties connecting them to the local community, to
its political organizations and to its lawyers. The judge was a
community leader, active in its affairs and drawn from among
its influential lawyer elite. He needed the backing of the polit-
ical leadership of the community to be selected as judge, and
he had to preserve the goodwill of that leadership to retain
the position. Through this network, courthouse constituents
relayed their views on the effectiveness of the judicial system
to the individual judge. Within this network, judges were not
relieved from all inducements and pressures that might influ-
ence their behavior, but theoretically the network was bal-
anced so that no single influence overpowered the others. The
dynamic balance of this network both supported the judges
and gave them a sense of position, perspective and limits.
Thus, judicial autonomy depended not upon leaving judges
alone but upon maintaining the balance of diverse demands
on the judge. This balance was achieved by providing the in-
dividual judge with the continuing information needed for
self-direction.
IV. THE CHANGING COMMUNITY
An eminent legal historian has noted that "[in 1950 state
courts had about the same structure and powers that they had
one hundred years before."' 8 Since 1950, however, there have
been remarkable changes in the organization of the judiciary
in virtually every state of the nation. The political structure of
state courthouses is built upon the assumption that each com-
munity will have only a few judges who will live and work in
17 In West Germany there is a judge for every 1.96 lawyers in private practice, in
France a judge for every 2.46 private practice lawyers, and in Sweden one for every
1.94. Id. at Ch. X, Table I.
Is W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 88 (1973).
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close contact with the bar and the local political elite. This
system operates well so long as the ties between important po-
litical constituencies in the community and key officials, in-
cluding the judge, are close and provide constant communica-
tion. There is ample basis for objective skepticism about this
model, however. Changing patterns of growth and new politi-
cal styles have produced communities that are organized very
differently from those of the preceding generations. Urbaniza-
tion and suburbanization have affected both large and small
communities, with the result that there is less consensus on
social values. The conflict among divergent points of view is
sharper, even in small communities. While substantial varia-
tions in values always have existed, it is considered more ap-
propriate to assert these divergent points of view. Eventually
these divergent points of view are brought into focus in the
courthouse.
The judge of an earlier day was the leader of a close and
closed community that now is changing in size, shape and
structure. The community at one time was basically rural,
with an economic base tied to land and locality, but now the
community is part of a national or world market. The mem-
bers of this new community are highly mobile, and communi-
cations have improved to the point where group identification
with people outside the community frequently is easier than
preserving ties to those within the community.
Despite these changes, most local courts still retain a sim-
ple organizational structure with one or a few judges and a
central file system. The judges or "courts" share a common
building, but for all other purposes they each do their own
work. In metropolitan areas, by contrast, a score to several
hundred judges preside over a tremendous number of law-
suits. The work of this complex organization is coordinated by
calendar systems that schedule and allocate the tasks of indi-
vidual judges. Court clerks may number in the thousands, and
they work for the court system rather than for an individual
judge.
Courts have also been affected by the general crisis in lo-
cal government that is evident in many areas of American life.
In the courthouse, as elsewhere, the major dimension of this
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crisis has been fiscal, as local governments have struggled to
meet increasing demands for services from a narrow revenue
base largely derived from the taxation of real property. For
the judiciary, this crisis appears not only in a perennial
shortage of funds for administrative support but also in the
form of pressure to shift fiscal responsibility for the courts
from the local to the state government. The result is that the
local-based judiciary, which depended upon the county gov-
ernment for fiscal support and oversight, has been transferred
to a state-based court system funded from a state budget and
controlled by a statewide administrative structure. As local
governments find it harder to meet increasing fiscal demands,
there are strong incentives to give up the cost of the court and
concomitantly to surrender control of the courthouse. When
fiscal responsibility shifts, a shift in administrative control in-
evitably follows.
V. THE CHANGING JUDICIAL WORKLOAD
Different communities generate different lawsuits. The
pace and pressures on some urban judges are overpowering as
they attempt to cope with tremendous amounts of work. In
contrast, the small, traditional community generated only a
modest amount of litigation. Most cases arose out of private
property disputes and petty crimes. The cases tended to be
relatively simple and the court did not sit constantly. Gener-
ally, court was in session for a few days or a week four times a
year. The assumption was that judges would dispose of cases
by trial, often with a jury. The judge in a small rural commu-
nity often was likely to know personally the lawyers who came
to court. Attorneys, not the judge, managed the pretrial stages
of litigation. The lawyers filed pleadings, discovered the evi-
dence and brought the case for trial. The judge tried the cases
as the lawyers brought them in, thereby achieving an econom-
ical use of a small number of judges. A court need not grow
very much, however, before problems will arise in this simple
managerial scheme. As soon as judicial business requires more
than one judge, the court must devise some method to allocate
work among the available judges. As the volume of work
grows, schedule conflicts are more likely to arise, and manag-
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ing dockets and calendars becomes a full-time job for an office
of clerks.
As a community grows, the judicial workload grows even
more rapidly. Larger communities produce more lawsuits, and
their disputes often are more complicated. Today's judges are
often in session all day, five days a week, at least ten months a
year. The modern trial court has aptly been described as an
assembly line.19 More complicated cases involve time-consum-
ing preliminary motions, lengthy trials, and extensive prepa-
ration. As cases become more complex, attorneys come to rely
heavily on time as a weapon, using maneuver and delay to
confuse the opposition, to induce an advantageous offer of set-
tlement, to forestall an inevitable conviction as long as possi-
ble and to avoid paying today what one would prefer paying
tomorrow. The more complex the case, the more opportunities
exist for delay.
As the judicial workload increases, the judge is less able
to force cases to trial. This is important because the credible
threat of trial is probably the most effective incentive to a set-
tlement between the parties. For at least a century, settlement
has been the predominant method of disposing of cases in
most courts. Judges try only about one civil or criminal case
in ten; the rest are settled out of court.20 Criminal cases are
dismissed by the prosecution, or the defendant pleads guilty.
Civil cases are abandoned by the plaintiff with or without a
financial settlement by the defendant. When a court relies
upon disposition by settlement, the volume of work in the
court becomes significant, because the existence of a backlog
reduces the ability to threaten a trial and increases the oppor-
tunity to delay and avoid trial.
In the simple courthouse, the attorneys' control over the
preparation and presentation of cases relieves the judges of
11 See note 6 supra for one jurist's analysis of the similarity between the assem-
bly line and the modern court.
'0 Of the 552,000 dispositions in California Superior Courts in 1976-77, excluding
those dismissed for lack of prosecution, only 10% involved a contested trial and 1.4%
a jury trial. CAL. 1977 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT Table XVIH-A, at 204. A Federal
Judicial Center study of federal district courts in 1975 found that complete trials
occurred in 12.9% of all dispositions. INTERIM REPORT, DISTRICT COURT STUDIES PROJ-
ECT 37 (1976).
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administrative burdens and allows a small number of judges
to run the system. As the work and size of the court increase,
an attorney's ability to paralyze the process by dilatory ma-
neuvers creates new needs for administrative control of the
process and becomes the source of new problems.
Further, as the judiciary grows, a hierarchy develops
among the judges. Traditionally, the title of chief judge was
conferred on the basis of seniority and was largely honorary.
The chief judge would preside at the judges' occasional meet-
ings to decide court business. His major job was to gain judi-
cial consensus. In a number of courts, however, this model is
being replaced by professional management, responsible for
the daily supervision of the courts. The chief judge is relieved
of other judicial functions to devote full time to supervising
the judicial operations of the court. Today's chief judge is not
merely a genial presiding officer; he is likely to have substan-
tial authority to assign judges to specific cases. Such a chief
judge has power to reward and punish judges in order to gain
compliance. The presence of an increasingly powerful admin-
istration creates new questions as to what is appropriate judi-
cial performance. Individual judges now must deal with bu-
reaucratic superiors who supervise and review their work,
award promotions and impose discipline. Thus, while inde-
pendent judges were politically accountable in ways that en-
hanced the quality of their decisions, today's overly adminis-
tered judges may be held accountable in ways that threaten to
erode the quality of decisions.
VI. THE THREAT OF COURT ADMINISTRATION
Court administration plays a paradoxical role, for court
management is a part of the solution to the problems pres-
ently confronting judges. At the same time, however, adminis-
tration creates new problems for an autonomous trial judici-
ary. Without improved administration, it is doubtful that
courts can cope with a growing and increasingly complex
caseload. But when managerial concerns dominate the judici-
ary, individual judges gradually are reduced from independent
community leaders to civil servant technicians.
Trial judges are particularly sensitive to administrative
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pressures, which operate directly on them through the admin-
istrators' power to assign judges to jobs within the court, to
control the budget, and to assert a growing influence over ju-
dicial promotions. As these pressures mount, the indirect and
informal network supporting autonomy becomes over-
whelmed, distorted and ultimately displaced. As a court de-
velops an increasingly bureaucratic organization, its leaders
begin to believe that judicial autonomy belongs to the system,
not to the individual judge, and that the judge's proper loy-
alty is to administrative superiors, rather than to the complex
network of constituents. Doing justice in such a setting be-
comes equated with doing the organization's work. Manage-
ment tends to focus on matters it can count and report on, at
the expense of subtler qualitative dimensions of the decision-
making process. The maintenance of judicial quality depends
upon striking a balance between quantitative management
control and the qualitative view of court effectiveness.
Court administrators tend to separate the process of mov-
ing a dispute through litigation from the process of adjudica-
tion, the case-deciding function of judges. Consequently, cases
are reduced to interchangeable units of equal value in an ac-
counting system. As a result, statistical reports that count the
number of cases in various categories represent the primary
measure of effective court operations. Managerial problems
gain independent significance; backlog, delay and poor use of
courtrooms are viewed as problems requiring special solutions.
Virtually every major trial court in America invests great
amounts of time, talent and money in administrative matters.
Voluminous reports, ambitious structural reforms and com-
plex electronic equipment are harnessed to deal with manage-
ment problems. But management makes no reports on the im-
pact these administrative practices have on the quality of
decisions, nor does it report the extent to which these deci-
sions conform to the community's sense of justice or the law's
need for growth.
Court management invariably views individual courts in
terms of a larger "system," which may include all the judges
in a courthouse, in a community or in a state. The inevitable
result is that administrators no longer see the judge as an in-
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dependent actor. The traditional jurist may have been idio-
syncratic and often autocratic, but at least these qualities em-
phasized the importance of what was done by the judge.
When the administrative organization becomes the center of
attention, however, the judge's role is altered. These adminis-
trative interests capture the judge's attention, for manage-
ment has direct power to reward and punish the judge. The
indirect pressures exerted on the judge, which operate
through the informal influence of traditional community ties,
diminish by comparison. Ultimately, preoccupation with court
management becomes a threat to both judicial autonomy and
effectiveness. If every docket in every court in America were
up to date and if every court were disposing of cases with op-
timal efficiency, nothing meaningful would be accomplished
unless good decisions were made in individual cases. Nothing
is gained by mandating change in the name of efficiency if
judges focus their attention on the concerns of management
rather than on the concerns of justice.
VII. THE CHANGING JUDIcIAL ROLE
The physical setting and the etiquette of judicial proce-
dure can produce in judges a sense of infallible authority that
provides little inducement for critical self-evaluation. Both in-
side and outside the courtroom, judges are set apart and
treated with respect. They must deal with the magical aura of
their robes and bench. Unless judges can maintain a realistic
sense of their own limits, they may behave in a preemptory,
superior, overbearing and parental manner.
Since a major feature of a judicial career is status and
position, many people choose to become judges because the
idea of having power and authority attracts them. Possession
of authority is a psychological fact in a judge's work life.
Those who deal with a judge respond to that power in both
rational and irrational ways. They fawn, defer, challenge and
rebel. They project on the judge many of the expectations and
feelings they have nurtured toward parents, teachers and
other familiar authority figures.
In reality, however, this powerful psychological authority
is counterbalanced by the adversary system of litigation in
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which the parties and their lawyers conduct the lawsuit.
Judges are expected to disguise their power with a neutral,
passive mask. The lawyers, rather than the judge, frame the
issues, gather and present the proof and do most of the talk-
ing in court. The judge decides the issue but with the assis-
tance of the litigants and their lawyers, who are responsible
for conducting an independent investigation to uncover the
evidence relevant to the issues.
Continental European judges play a quite different role.
They are likely to serve on panels considering a case rather
than sitting individually. Further, the European judges play a
significantly more active part in trial.21 The judges and clerks
assemble a dossier containing the legal arguments and factual
proof of the parties. Counsel may suggest witnesses to be
heard and questions to be asked, but the judges decide
whether the evidence presented either by the parties or
through the judges' own investigation is sufficient. The active
inquisitorial participation by the judges continues throughout
the proceedings. In a criminal case, for instance, even the con-
fession of the accused will not excuse the continental judge
from conducting a full independent investigation of the facts.
In the American adversary trial system, however, judges are
permitted to consider only the evidence presented by the par-
ties and then only within the limits of rigid rules of evidence.
In continental systems, rules of evidence and procedure are
quite simple and are left largely to the common sense of the
judge.
Judges are less likely to encounter in their work the kinds
of rewards and sanctions found in most types of employment.
21 A clear description of the operation of the German procedural system in a civil
case is found in Kaplan, von Mehren, & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure,
71 HARV. L. REv. 1193, 1443 (1958). See also Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and
Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 1088-95 (1975); Goldstein & Marcus,
The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy
and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977); Rosett, Trial and Discretion in Dutch Crimi-
nal Justice, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 353 (1972).
The Goldstein and Marcus study suggests that even in Europe, where the judge
is supposed to be active, he is likely not to be so. This suggests that the apparent
contradictions between the formal authority of the judge and the dominance of the
advocates and parties is not limited to our system. J. MERRYMAN, THE CwVm LAW
TRADMON (1969).
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Judges do not have bosses watching, directing, correcting,
praising and threatening them. Although other professionals,
such as doctors, lawyers and professors also work alone,
judges, unlike other professionals, lack clear affirmative re-
wards for performance. Promotion within the judiciary is a
growing but still unlikely prospect; furthermore, many trial
judges would not consider promotion to an appeals court a re-
ward. Realistically, appointment to the bench is a terminal
appointment; few judges are promoted, and fewer are forced
from office before death or retirement. Moreover, judges' sala-
ries are fixed and may not be reduced during their terms of
office. Relieved of the danger of demotion, they also surrender
most hope of advancement.
In the past, a judicial position was often one phase in the
development of a political career. A successful, elected official
might run for an elective judgeship, retain the position for a
while, and at the right moment run for a higher elective office.
Changing standards of judicial behavior make maintaining
partisan political contacts harder for judges, since judges no
longer can be actively involved in party affairs or fund rais-
ing.22 As judicial selection and retention is removed from par-
tisan politics, becoming a judge requires one to step out of the
political arena and makes it less likely that one will be able to
step back in later.
Most judges would consider returning to a law practice
undesirable, particularly if the judge has served on the bench
for a number of years. The judge is likely to feel ill-equipped
to return to serving the needs of private clients. Consequently,
some judges have an uneasy feeling that there is no alterna-
tive for them if the judicial office no longer occupies their
interest.
Becoming a good judge typically requires substantial
changes in professional personality, self-perception and hab-
its. One becomes a judge in our system, not at the beginning
of a career, but only after demonstrating competence as a law-
yer. For most purposes, being a good lawyer and being a good
judge involve very different working personalities. These dif-
22 ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7.
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ferences were succinctly described by a leading California at-
torney, who is the husband of a distinguished former federal
judge:
We all know that what you see depends upon where you sit.
And some changes of scene are more critical than others, but
I know of none more likely to change one's personal views
than by walking around a simple table, climbing three little
steps, and donning a black robe.
23
Lawyers, particularly the trial bar that forms the nucleus
of the bench, are a notably ambitious, competitive, striving
group. They lead active and often combative lives. They
orchestrate trials in a way that displays their own special tal-
ents. The activity is inherently social, and the rewards for suc-
cess are open-ended. Top-ranked lawyers are paid hand-
somely, are honored professionally and can possibly rise to the
stature of folk-heroes.
Trial lawyers are not office lawyers; they are often out
and away from their desks. Unlike their colleagues practicing
probate or tax law, litigators are not always expected to be
available. Their time can never be too tightly structured; they
may work day and night for weeks preparing and presenting a
trial. Yet on other days, when the case that was scheduled to
occupy all their time is settled or adjourned, they may return
to the office to catch up with paperwork or may simply take
the afternoon off.
When a litigator becomes a judge, however, he finds him-
self physically confined to the courtroom and chambers. The
judge's staff must keep track of him because administrative
judges or lawyers often come unexpectedly to his chambers to
have an order signed. No one is disturbed when an attorney
plays golf in mid-afternoon, but changing expectations of judi-
cial performance make an increasing number of judges un-
comfortable about spending time away from their desks.
Pressures of time and calendar require the judge to focus
only on what is presented, without looking too far afield. A
day's calendar may contain dozens of matters. The distance
and inequality built into the judge's position of authority con-
23 Hufstedler, Professional Expectations, 15 JUDGES' J. 74 (1976).
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strain the judge's opportunities to deal with people directly
and sympathetically. Procedural limits inhibit the judge from
interfering with the flow of the preceedings. Individuals who
appear come sharply into focus only for a few moments and
are whisked away to be replaced by new people and new is-
sues. There is no opportunity for a relaxed interview, for in-
sightful probing beyond the superficial contact required by
procedural rules. In time, judges eventually develop a pat-
terned approach to match the work.
An interesting and well-presented trial remains a fasci-
nating experience for the judge, but few judges spend much of
their time with such cases. Most of the judge's work is routine
and eventually boring. The judge probably appeared as coun-
sel in the routine cases as a young lawyer, progressing to more
interesting matters as he developed his craft. The successful
lawyer may hire a younger associate to handle the less inter-
esting cases or may refer such cases to other attorneys.
Judges, however, have no such option. They are charged with
deciding all cases brought before them; they cannot refuse a
case, nor can they hire a substitute to sit on the bench and
listen to bumblers wrestle with the insignificant.
In order to adapt to this passive role, some judges culti-
vate a judicial image. They read more, analyze the law in
greater depth and find other appropriate outlets to express
their training and wisdom. Some of the judges respond to the
sense of isolation, constriction and frustration inherent in the
position by focusing on the people who appear before them.
These judges increasingly view their jobs as positions in a peo-
ple-service industry, with this aspect taking precedence over
the administrative and legal facets of the task. Still other
judges respond by seeking power either as a chief judge or as
an administrator. Some judges become alcoholics or otherwise
burn out. Most judges value their rare opportunities to speak
in the name of higher values, to listen to a mundane dispute
and find it suddenly lit by a flash of principle. These opportu-
nities are the judge's triumphs, but they also suggest the
judge's core problem. Perhaps the most striking observation
made by judges the author recently interviewed was the dis-
crepancy between their expectations of the job and its daily
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realities. Their work is physically restricted and sometimes
isolated. They must hear routine matters, presented by law-
yers who do not meet their standards of professional perform-
ance. Many judges also are troubled by the degree to which
the security of their position takes on the qualities of a dead-
end. There are too few great moments and too many boring
days. Having arrived at a safe harbor, they miss the adventure
of the voyage.
VIII. THE CHANGING LAWYER-JUDGE BALANCE
The problems which judges must cope with are aggra-
vated by the shifting balance between the judiciary and law-
yers. The relations between judges and lawyers are close, and
they are mutually dependent. Lawyers are the strongest inter-
est group influencing the judiciary. Lawyers are very influen-
tial in deciding who becomes a judge, and they are a major
source of judicial campaign contributions. Lawyers have a di-
rect and daily interest in both the quality and efficiency of
court operations.
The American judicial system has functioned with a rela-
tively small judiciary by relying on lawyers to do much of the
work assigned to judges in other legal systems. Such a system
emphasizes the uniqueness of the judge. The lawyers are pri-
marily responsible for organizing and presenting the case and
are also expected to educate the judge regarding technical
matters of law. The judge brings to each case a broader per-
spective, wider experience and relative freshness. It is both a
glory and an absurdity that a federal district judge may hear
in rapid succession a constitutional claim, a technical tax or
patent matter, a seaman's personal injury claim and a check
forgery charge involving a Treasury check for $3.98. The judge
can absorb this variety because it is the lawyer's function to
brief the judge on the specifics needed to decide each case.
The lawyer-centered system is not without its costs.
Judges are forced to maintain the good-will of the lawyers
who facilitate their work. Indeed, a good judge might be de-
fined as one who can keep the lawyers happy and productive.
This can be accomplished so long as the interests of the law-
yers and the judge are identical and the interests of all are
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advancing justice. The highly adversary perspective of law-
yers, however, leads them to place their client's particular in-
terest above broader social interests. Moreover, the existing
system often gives the lawyer a direct economic interest in
prolonged and expensive litigation. Perhaps an inevitable con-
sequence of lawyer domination is that the process will become
structured to maximize the lawyers' interests at the expense
of the interests of the judiciary, the litigants and the general
public. In too many lawsuits the only victors are the lawyers,
and the costs of litigation are a major portion of the amount
in dispute. As lawyers become more of a special interest
group, their control of the process becomes a threat to the
judge's sense of direction and to the quality of the judicial
product. A balance needs to be struck to enable the judge to
assert social interests more emphatically in the face of the
lawyers' particular interests.
CONCLUSION
The forms of accountability most used in the past, which
relied upon the vitality of the local community and its domi-
nant political groups, are no longer sufficient to support the
judge. The decline in traditional methods of insuring account-
ability does not mean, however, that courts now operate in a
political vacuum. As the role of the local community has di-
minished in importance, political power has shifted to an
emerging judicial administration and to the lawyers who con-
trol the court's litigation. Thus, the weakening of extrajudicial
accountability has been matched by the growth of new forms
of accountability within the judicial organization. This has not
been a simple cause and effect relationship, but the two phe-
nomena are connected. A major argument against the old po-
litical order was that it was inefficient and was not organized
in a business-like way. Once established, the new court man-
agement, however, is likely to be a major advocate for changes
that will undercut the old political patterns. Moreover, a new
political structure arises to allocate power within the emerging
managerial hierarchy. Increasingly, the administration has the
power to give out rewards within the judiciary. It assigns the
judges, controls the budget, authorizes vacation and travel,
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and, in several states, influences the promotion of judges to
higher courts.
The new network of bar and administration is seldom
overtly partisan; nonetheless, it is political. The power of ad-
ministration is enhanced by its apparent necessity-it
promises the public a judiciary that can cope with modern
conditions. Judges need the cooperation of the lawyers to dis-
pose of the cases. At the same time, the new network presents
a threat to the autonomy of the individual judge and distorts
the quality of the judicial product. Administration imposes
measures of technical competence and efficiency that often
undercut the quality and content of decisions. Trial lawyers
usurp the judge's authority to decide cases by their control
over the calendar and settlement, thereby replacing the
judge's deliberated justice with their own particular interests.
The declining influence of local politics, the ascending
power of the administration, and the shifting lawyer-judge re-
lationship all suggest that judicial accountability needs to be
supplemented with the return of a stronger voice for constitu-
encies outside the system. Assessment of the judge by the
community in which the court operates could be an important
tool to redress the balance of political influences on the judge
and to maintain the political accountability of the individual
judge. This in turn strengthens the judge, because his exercise
of power is legitimate. Thus, he is in a better position to speak
for the law and the values of the community and is better
equipped to resist those forces that would make him their
servant.
